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Brood parasites exploit their host in order to increase their own
fitness. Typically, this results in an arms race between parasite
trickery and host defence. Thus, it is puzzling to observe
hosts that accept parasitism without any resistance. The ‘mafia’
hypothesis suggests that these hosts accept parasitism to avoid
retaliation. Retaliation has been shown to evolve when the
hosts condition their response to mafia parasites, who use
depredation as a targeted response to rejection. However, it
is unclear if acceptance would also emerge when ‘farming’
parasites are present in the population. Farming parasites
use depredation to synchronize the timing with the host,
destroying mature clutches to force the host to re-nest. Herein,
we develop an evolutionary model to analyse the interaction
between depredatory parasites and their hosts. We show that
coevolutionary cycles between farmers and mafia can still
induce host acceptance of brood parasites. However, this
equilibrium is unstable and in the long-run the dynamics of
this host–parasite interaction exhibits strong oscillations: when
farmers are the majority, accepters conditional to mafia (the
host will reject first and only accept after retaliation by the
parasite) have a higher fitness than unconditional accepters
(the host always accepts parasitism). This leads to an increase
in mafia parasites’ fitness and in turn induce an optimal
environment for accepter hosts.
1. Introduction
Interactions between species, whether antagonistic, competitive
or mutualistic, can drive evolution and diversification. Coevolution
2016 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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between antagonistic species involves constant adaptation and counter adaptation. A fascinating
example is brood parasitism, where the parasites avoid the costs of parental care by laying their eggs
in a host’s nest. This elicits coevolutionary responses: hosts acquire defences to escape from parasitism,
and the parasites in turn develop new ways to trick the host. There are numerous ways a host can resist
parasitism; for example, by using egg signatures to identify the foreign egg, or by synchronizing nesting
to limit parasitism occurrences [1–4]. Thus, it remains puzzling why some hosts accept any form of
parasitism [5,6].
To address this question, several studies have modelled these host–parasite interactions (i.e. [7–12]),
including models that explicitly focus on the ‘mafia hypothesis’ [1,13–15]. According to these models,
hosts should accept parasitism when it is likely that a parasite would retaliate [8–10]. Simulations showed
that the respective models can lead to cyclic patterns where retaliation evolves when host rejection is
abundant [8–10]. Retaliatory behaviour, in turn, can emerge when hosts have evolved plastic behaviours,
and when hosts are likely to reject the first parasitism attempt [11]. This is in line with experimental
evidence showing that retaliation can lead hosts to accept brood parasites in subsequent nests [14,15].
On the population level, these adaptations and counter-adaptations cause coevolutionary cycles: when
retaliatory behaviour (the so-called ‘mafia’) is abundant, there is a fitness advantage for accepter hosts.
However, as the frequency of accepter hosts increases, it is no longer necessary for parasites to retaliate,
and non-retaliators increase in frequency. Once the threat of retaliation has waned, hosts should reject
first parasitism attempts, selecting for retaliatory behaviour again and thereby closing the evolutionary
cycle. These models provide a glimpse into the complex frequency-dependent effects of parasitism.
The resulting coevolutionary arms race leads to oscillations with one species lagging behind the
other [8–11].
Although experimental evidence shows that avian brood parasites, such as the great spotted cuckoos
or the brown-headed cowbirds, exhibit retaliatory behaviour [14,15], the mafia hypothesis is still
controversial [16,17]. Retaliatory behaviour seems too costly to emerge in the first place. Mafia parasites
would need to observe the respective host’s nest and after recognizing that their egg was rejected, they
would need to punish the host by destroying the entire nest. Instead, it has been suggested that destroyed
nests are not a consequence of retaliatory behaviour, but of farming behaviour [1,14,15,18]. Farming
parasites use depredation to synchronize the timing with the host. They destroy mature clutches to
force the host to re-nest, which creates a new opportunity for the parasite. Thus, both farming and
mafia behaviour involve depredation as a tactic, but only mafia parasites use depredation as a targeted
response to rejection. However, it remains difficult to empirically distinguish retaliatory behaviour from
farming behaviour [1,14,15,18], thus making it hard to disentangle whether host acceptance is driven by
depredation or retaliation.
A recent theoretical study incorporated both depredatory behaviours into a single model, and found
that both types of depredators are favoured over non-depredators when hosts show a plastic response
[19]. Surprisingly, however, the model also suggested that hosts should not exhibit any plastic response in
the first place. Instead, hosts should always reject parasitic eggs, independent of any former interactions.
This conclusion contradicts previous work proposing that host acceptance should naturally evolve when
retaliation is common [8–11]. The model in [19] assumes that after depredation, retaliatory parasites
are not more likely to return to the same host than are non-retaliatory parasites. However, for a mafia
strategy to be successful, it seems to be critical that retaliatory parasites revisit the same host—in fact,
previous simulations have confirmed that retaliators can gain a higher fitness from returning [11]. When
mafia parasites are likely to return, there is also a strong evolutionary pressure for hosts to accept
parasitism. This simulation result has also been observed experimentally [15]—warblers (hosts) that
accepted the parasite produced significantly more offspring than the ones that rejected the parasite.
Experimental evidence also shows that retaliation may not only promote acceptance, but it may also
delay the evolution of rejector hosts [15,18,20]. These arguments indicate that host acceptance may be
a robust strategy, even when we include farming as a possible behaviour of the parasite. Herein, we
aim to explore this question in detail. We use an evolutionary model to describe the interaction of
farmers and mafia parasites, and we analyse how farming changes the way hosts respond to brood
parasitism.
2. Model
Based on [11], we have developed a model that incorporates both farming and mafia parasites. The host–
parasite interaction takes the form of a game (figure 1), in which the breading season is divided into
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Figure 1. Game-tree for the host–parasite interaction. The host lays bh eggs in a clutch, which may become parasitized (at a cost cp) or
depredated. Depredation forces the host to re-nest, costing cs. Hosts may reject (at cost cr) or accept the parasitic egg and incur nestling
cost cn. The parasite gains the accepted egg.
several stages. Initially, the host lays bh eggs in a clutch that can either be parasitized or depredated by
a parasite. After parasitism, the host may accept the parasitic egg incurring a parasitism cost cp and
a nestling cost cn. Alternatively, the host may reject the parasitic egg at a cost cr (the rejection cost
encompasses a host’s ability to recognize and eject the foreign egg) and risk retaliation. If the nest is
depredated, either by a farmer (before parasite eggs are laid) or by a retaliator (after her egg was rejected),
hosts are forced to re-nest at a cost cs.
For the evolutionary model, we consider four types of hosts behaviours: two unconditional
behaviours, which are to always accept or reject parasitism, and two conditional behaviours, which are
to accept only after depredation or only after retaliation. The conditional behaviours mimic a host’s
ability to learn and change as a response to repeated interactions with the parasite [21]. For the parasites,
we consider three types of behaviour: (i) non-depredating parasites; (ii) mafia retaliators that depredate
the nest after rejection. They re-parasitize the same host, and they destroy all future clutches unless
acceptance occurs; and (iii) farmers depredate the host’s nest in the first stage to create an opportunity
for parasitism. For simplicity, we neglect the possibility of parasites that engage in both farming and
retaliation simultaneously—in particular, farmers do not return to the host after parasitism.
The fitness of each type is calculated at the end of a season. Non-depredatory parasites N lay a
total of βN eggs per season, whereas mafia and farming parasites, M and F, lay a total of βM and βF
eggs, respectively. We assume βM ≤ βF and βM ≤ βN to incorporate that depredation may be costly for
the mafia parasite (for example, because of cognitive and energy costs, [16]). We do not presume any
particular relationship between between βF and βN. The case βF < βN may be justified because farming
requires more efforts than non-depredating behaviour. On the other hand, βF ≥ βN may be justified
because farmers are able to create additional parasitism opportunities. The three types of parasites have
frequencies denoted by xN, xM and xF, such that xN + xM + xF = 1. Likewise, the four types of hosts,
accepters A, conditional to mafia CM, conditional to depredation CD, and rejecters R have respective
frequencies yA, yCM, yCD and yR such that yA + yCM + yCD + yR = 1.
We calculate the average fitness of each parasite by considering the average number of accepted eggs
reared by the host. To this end, we also need to consider the average number of laid eggs per host
interaction. Non-depredatory parasites lay a single egg per parasitized host nest, which only becomes
accepted if the host happens to be an accepter. For a mafia parasite, the average number of eggs laid
per parasitized host nest is yA + 2yCM + 2yCD + 2yR = 2 − yA, whereas the expected number of accepted
eggs per parasitized host nest is yA + yCM + yCD. Finally, farmer parasites lay a single egg per nest, and
the expected number of accepted eggs per parasitized host is yA + yCD. The average fitness of a parasite
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is thus given by
πN = yA · βN,
πM = yA + yCM + yCD2 − yA
· βM,
πF = (yA + yCD) · βF.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.1)
To derive the average fitness of the hosts, we first need to calculate the probability with which a
host is visited by each parasite type. Farmers and non-depredatory parasites visit βF and βN different
hosts, respectively, whereas mafia parasites require on average βM/(2 − yA) different hosts. Thus, the
probability that a foreign egg in a host’s nest comes from a non-depredatory parasite, farmer, or mafia
parasite is proportional to xNβN, xFβF or xMβM/(2 − yA), respectively. As a consequence, the average
fitness of a parasitized host becomes
πA = bh − cp − cn −
cs · βF · xF
βFxF + βNxN + βMxM/(2 − yA)
,
πCM = bh − cp − cr −
(cn + cs) · βM · xM/(2 − yA) + cs · βF · xF
βFxF + βNxN + βMxM/(2 − yA)
,
πCD = bh − cp −
(cs + cn + cr)βMxM/(2 − yA) + crβNxN + (cs + cn)βFxF
βFxF + βNxN + βMxM/(2 − yA)
,
πR =
(bh − cp − cr) · βNxN + (bh − cp − cs − cr) · βF · xF
βFxF + βNxN + βM · xM/(2 − yA)
.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(2.2)
To model the population dynamics, we assume that the frequencies of each type change according to
the replicator equation, x˙i = xi(πi − π¯) for the parasites with π¯ =
∑
j πjxj and y˙i = yi(πi − π¯) for the hosts
with π¯ =∑j πjyj [22]. That is, strategies that yield a fitness above the population average are expected to
spread, whereas strategies that yield a fitness below the population average decrease over time.
3. Results and discussion
We fist explore the strategy dynamics of two different situations, one which assumes βM < βF = βN
and the other βM < βF < βN, as shown in figure 2. When farmers lay at least as many eggs as non-
depredating parasites, we observe coevolutionary cycles between mafia and farmer parasites, and
between accepter hosts (always accepting) and conditional accepter hosts (reject first and accept after
retaliation). Conversely, when farmers have a disadvantage compared with the N type, we observe
coevolutionary cycles between non-depredatory parasites and mafia parasites, and between accepter
hosts and conditional accepter hosts. Both examples illustrate that accepter hosts can have a temporary
fitness advantage over other host types.
These evolutionary outcomes can be understood explicitly. First, unconditional rejection is never
optimal because conditional behaviour leads to a higher fitness, πCM ≥ πR. Similarly, given that cr < cn, it
is better for hosts to condition their behaviours on retaliation rather than on depredation, as πCM ≥ πCD.
Hence, the abundance of CD is expected to drop in any mixed population, and eventually yCD ≈ 0.
Furthermore, the laid eggs per season determine whether farmers or non-depredating parasites gain
more offspring. When βF ≥ βN, farming is more profitable, πF ≥ πN, and we can simplify our model to a
parasite population composed of just depredators (mafia and farmers) and a host population composed
of unconditional accepters and accepters conditional to mafia. For this reduced system, the replicator
dynamics simplifies to
x˙M = xM(1 − xM)(πM − πF),
y˙A = yA(1 − yA)(πA − πCM).
}
(3.1)
Where the remaining abundances are xF = 1 − xM and yCM = 1 − yA. For cr > cn, the dynamics has no
interior equilibrium and mafia behaviour will vanish. For cr < cn, the dynamics has an equilibrium
(x∗M, y
∗
A) in the interior of the state space, which is from πM = πF and πA = πCM,
x∗M =
(
1 + cs + cr
cn − cr
(
1 −
√
1 − βM
βF
))−1
,
y∗A = 1 −
√
1 − βM
βF
.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(3.2)
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Figure 2. Dynamics of host–parasite interactions. The figure shows frequencies of parasites (a(i),b(i),c(i)) and hosts (a(ii),b(ii),c(ii)).
(a) When βF = βN, we find oscillations between mafia and farmer parasites, and between conditional accepter and accepter hosts.
(b) When βF < βN, the non-predatory parasites displace the farmers, leading to oscillations between mafia and non-depredatory
parasites, and between conditional tomafia and unconditional accepter hosts. (c) For a simplifiedmodel with only two strategies present
in each population, we can show the existence of a mixed equilibrium. However, that equilibrium is unstable; nearby initial populations
follow cycles with increasing amplitude. The insets shows the fitness table arising from a single host–parasite interaction: however,
owing to the nonlinear interaction, this cannot be directly interpreted as a game-theoretical pay-offmatrix, see equations (2.1) and (2.2).
However, this equilibrium is unstable (appendix A), and in the long-run the dynamics of this host–
parasite interaction exhibits strong oscillations (as depicted in figure 2). If most parasites engage in
farming, hosts that condition acceptance to just after retaliation have a higher fitness than unconditional
accepters. As the frequency of conditional accepters increases, the mafia parasites’ fitness supersedes the
fitness of farmers. In turn, as mafia parasites increase in frequency, they induce an optimal environment
for unconditional accepter hosts, eventually leading the parasite population back to the farmer strategy.
Interestingly, one can observe exactly the same dynamics when exploring the competition between
non-depredating parasites and mafia parasites [11]. Intuitively, for explaining the evolution of acceptance
among hosts, the distinction between farming behaviour and non-depredating parasites becomes
irrelevant. Both types evoke the same response among hosts, making it optimal for hosts to reject first
attempts. Thus, our model suggests that if accepting behaviour is observed in a host population, it needs
to be owing to the presence of retaliating parasites.
So far we have been able to show that even when both farmers and mafia interact, hosts will evolve
to accept some degree of parasitism. While our theory predicts cyclical dynamics, it is still debated
whether host–parasite interactions display any cycles at all [1,4,23,24]. In our model, there must be at
least two types of hosts and parasites available for cycles to occur, which in turn depends on the costs
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Figure 3. Exploring the effects of cost on host–parasite interactions whenβF > βm. There are two cases that can alter the dynamics of
the system: (a) when cr < cn, shows oscillations between mafia and farmers, and between conditional to mafia and accepter hosts. (b)
When cr ≥ cn, the rejection cost inhibits the emergence of conditional accepters and thus only farmers benefit, as a result we have a host
population composed of only accepters. The insets shows the fitness table arising from a single host–parasite interaction.
incurred when hosts and parasites interact. So far we have assumed that the costs of raising a nestling cn
outweigh the rejection cost cr (i.e. the cost for the host’s ability to recognize and eject a foreign egg without
errors). To address whether accepter hosts are able to evolve when rejection costs are low, our numerical
examples so far have assumed that the host incurs no extra costs when rejecting a foreign egg. Once
we relax this assumption and consider the case cr > 0, we identified that cycles tend to only occur when
rejection costs are less than nestling costs, cr < cn (see figure 3a, for an example with cr > 0). In that case,
one can show from the fitness equations in (2.2) that for hosts it is optimal always to accept parasitism,
as πA ≥ πCM, πA ≥ πCD and πA ≥ πR. The dynamics leads to a steady state in which hosts accept, and in
which the parasite with the highest number of eggs βi succeeds such as the example shown in figure 3b.
These regimes resemble the two competing hypothesis put forward to explain the lack of consensus
seen experimentally: the first is the evolutionary lag hypothesis, which states that hosts would naturally
evolve to defend against the current parasites which will then bring about change for the parasite who
must evolve to survive. The problem is time—we may not catch the next step of the arms race, because
there is a lag in their response and insufficient amount of time has passed for the adaptation to occur. The
second is the equilibrium hypothesis, which states that what we observe is a stable state where hosts are
behaving as they should [3,4]. Thus, our model suggests that if we assume low rejection costs relative to
nestling costs, cycles will exist leading to an evolutionary lag (experimentally, it can be shown that raising
a parasite’s egg incurs fitness loss for many hosts [2,4,23]). This prediction is in line with experimental
results of a system where the rejection costs of a host are zero [24]. However, once rejection costs exceed
nestling costs, the outcome will depend on the overall costs and competition within species. Future
empirical work could aim to disentangle the costs of the hosts, and generalize the patterns observed
in the model to the natural systems.
The general dynamical pattern discussed herein is consistent for both the simplified and complex
model. However, these models proposed still involve a number of simplifications. In particular, we did
not explicitly keep track of the time within a season (which is certainly an important variable to model the
effects of farming). Instead, the advantages of farming were incorporated indirectly, by giving farmers
additional opportunities to parasitize hosts. However, we expect our basic insights to be robust also for
models that include more detail: depending on environmental conditions, farming may be a profitable
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strategy for brood parasites, but it does not induce hosts to accept parasitism. By contrast, acceptance can
readily evolve when parasites engage in retaliatory behaviour, and if depredation is specifically targeted
at hosts who have previously rejected the parasite’s eggs. Our model also highlights that there may be
no optimal behaviour in these multispecies systems. Instead, hosts and parasites will typically remain in
a recurring process of mutual adaptation.
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Appendix A
To explore whether the interior fixed point of the simplified model is stable, we linearized the system
equation (3.1) around the fixed point (x∗M, y
∗
A). The corresponding Jacobian matrix takes the form
J =
(
0 a12
a21 a22
)
. (A 1)
The non-vanishing entries of J are
a12 = −2βM(cn − cr)(cr + cs)
√
1 − βM/βF
((cr + cs)(βM/βF) + (cn − cr)(1 +
√
1 − βM/βF))2
, (A 2a)
a21 =
√
1 − βM/βF · ((cn − cr) + (cr + cs)(1 −
√
1 − βM/βF))2
cn + cs , (A 2b)
a22 = (cn − cr)(cr + cs)cn + cs
(
2 −
√
1 − βM
βF
− 2 βF
βM
(
1 −
√
1 − βM
βF
))
. (A 2c)
Under the assumption that βM < βF and cr < cn, we have a12 < 0 and a21 > 0. In addition, we note that
a22 > 0 because the function f (z) = 2 −
√
1 − z − (2/z)(1 − √1 − z) is strictly positive in the interval z ∈
(0, 1). The Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix can be written as λ1,2 = ((tr J) ±
√
(tr J)2 − 4(det J))/2, where
tr J = a22 > 0 is the trace and det J = −a12a21 > 0 is the determinant of the Jacobian matrix. As (tr J) > 0,
the interior fixed point is unstable. Since none of the boundary fixed points is stable (each of the pure
host or parasite strategies can be invaded), the Poincaré–Bendixson theorem (e.g. [25]) implies that the
coevolutionary dynamics exhibits oscillations.
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